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Abstract—In our study, we seek to learn the real-time crowd
levels at popular points of interests based on users continually
sharing their location data. We evaluate the benefits of users
sharing their location data privately and non-privately, and show
that suitable privacy-preserving mechanisms provide incentives
for user participation in a private study as compared to a non-
private study.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today’s smartphones not only serve as a means of commu-
nication and computation, though they also include a variety of
sensors (e.g., proximity, accelerometer, gyroscopic, GPS, etc.).
Collection of this sensor information helps in the statistical
analysis of the user’s data. Various data analysts perform data
aggregation and try to extract meaning from this data.
However, with this wide array of sensors comes serious
privacy concerns with the large amount of personal real-
time data that is collected without individual’s consent or
knowledge. Of the more serious privacy violations is with
regards to location data. While location based services are
rising in popularity, the concerns of being constantly tracked
require proportional privacy-preserving mechanisms. There
needs to be a mechanism by which the analyst should be able
to receive the aggregated data in order to perform analysis but
preserving the user’s privacy at the same time.
In this paper, we examine a study which collects real-
time location data allowing individuals to see how crowded
particular points of interest are. Our cost is a function of time
in our study. The privacy mechanism we choose is that of
differential privacy, which distorts the aggregate sum in such
a way to hide the presence or absence of an individual.
Contemporary applications (e.g., Waze) continously col-
lect and store location data without regards to preserving
individual privacy. Our goal is to examine whether we can
align the incentives of individuals wishing to maximize their
time efficiency with the goals of privacy. Participation in
the non-private study allows individuals to optimize their
time usage at the expense of being constantly tracked. Our
evaluation demonstrates that the cost of the non-private study
is higher than the private study. Thus, it is more beneficial for
individuals to participate in the private study.
II. GOALS
We now describe the system goals, performance goals,
threat model, and privacy goals of the architecture as seen
in Figure 1.
A. System Goals
The system should support analysts who wish to run a pop-
ulation study. The analysts issue a query for those interested
data owners that privately reply. Analysts are able to formulate
long-standing signed queries. These queries continually elicit
privatized responses during the defined query epoch. The
analysts are deemed to be reputable, e.g., Department of
Transportation, National Institutes of Health, or Centers for
Disease Control. Each analyst controls an aggregation server.
We propose to conduct a study which will help individuals
estimate the amount of time that will be spent at a particular
location(e.g. gym, library, restaurant etc.) in and around cam-
pus based on the congestion (number of individuals present)
at that location. In order to find the number of users present
at a location, it is essential that the data owners publicly
reveal their location information. A survey/study needs to be
conducted which asks the data owners whether they were
present at a given location at a specific time. In our study,
it will be completely the data owner’s choice whether or
not to participate. Based on the number of individuals at
each location, we will be able to tell for each location, how
much time should an other individual wait before going to
that location in order to save time and avoid rush. Only
the individuals who decide to participate in the survey have
access to this information. Here, the incentive for the users to
participate in the survey is the time that they would be saving,
if they know in advance the rush at a particular location.
The queries are propagated using roadside WiFi units or
LTE repeaters. The requests may also be piggybacked on
responses to information requested by the data owners, or in
response to periodic polls. To reduce traffic overhead, or in
response to periodic polls the queries may be posted to an
edge website that mobiles of a certain class frequently check
(e.g., campus website).
The long-standing queries are needed to be fetched only
once by each data owner. The responses of data owners and ag-
gregation processing proceeds in epochs. That is every epoch
each data owner privately and anonymously transmits their
respective answer to the aggregator servers. The aggregation
servers then compute the final aggregate using the received
responses within this epoch. Epochs are defined on the order
of seconds.
As there is a tradeoff between privacy and utility, the system
should strike a superior balance the tradeoff of strong privacy
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Figure 1: System overview.
and utility. We strive for a small percentage of error for both
sparse and large datasets.
B. Performance Goals
The system should scale to hundreds of thousands of users
and be able to process results on the order of seconds. Net-
work bandwidth should be minimal as compared to existing
bandwidth hungry systems [1], [12].
C. Threat Model
Each aggregation server is owned by a set of distinct
reputable analysts. Aggregation servers are expected to be
available and online, so we do not consider denial of service
attacks whereby data owners are not able to transmit their
responses. We assume aggregation servers are honest-but-
curious, i.e., servers do not corrupt the messages though can
attempt to read all messages.
D. Privacy Goals
We assume all queries are signed and from reputable
analysts. This provides provenance in the case of a dishonest
analyst that may formulate a specially crafted query that
attempts to deprivatize a data owner.
Data owners’ privatized location responses should leak no
more data than if they were not participating in the population
study. Each data owner retains their own data on devices
that they control and manage. The data owners then choose
to participate in responding to each query. All responses
before they leave the data owner are privatized. The privacy
mechanism should satisfy the differential privacy criteria.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Differential Privacy
Differential privacy has become the gold standard privacy
mechanism which ensures that the output of a sanitization
mechanism does not violate the privacy of any individual
inputs. A privacy mechanism San() provides ε-differential
Figure 2: Privacy mechanisms.
privacy [3], [4] if, for all datasets D1 and D2 differing on
at most one record, and for all outputs O⊆ Range(San()):
Pr[San(D1) ∈ O]≤ eε ×Pr[San(D2) ∈ O] (1)
That is, the probability that a privacy mechansim San
produces a given output is almost independent of the presence
or absence of any individual record in the dataset. In other
words, it is difficult to determine whether any individual record
is in the dataset, thus protecting privacy. The privacy parameter
ε controls the tradeoff between the accuracy of a privacy
mechanism and the strength of its privacy guarantees: smaller
ε provides stronger privacy but lower accuracy, and vice versa.
There are two differential private mechanisms we consider:
the laplace mechanism and randomized response as seen in
Figure 2.
1) Laplace Mechanism: The Laplace privacy-preserving
mechanism [3], [4], [5] is a centralized mechanism whereby
an aggregator collects and stores the original, non-privatized
data and then releases privatized answers to queries. The
aggregator samples from the Laplace distribution such that
the aggregated response R is simply the sum of all the non-
privatized responses a and the Laplace noise n, R= a+n. The
Laplace privacy-preserving mechanism was one of the earliest
proposed differential privacy mechanisms, and provides the
highest accuracy due to it’s centralized nature.
2) Randomized Response: Randomized response [13] was
originally created by social scientists as a mechanism to
perform a population study over sensitive attributes (such as
drug use or certain ethical behaviors). Randomized response
allows data owners to locally randomize their truthful answer
to analyts’ sensitive queries and respond only with the pri-
vatized (locally randomized) answer. Randomized response
satisfies the differential privacy guarantee for individual data
owners and it provides the optimal sample complexity for local
differential privacy mechanisms [2].
So far, the randomized response mechanism has been widely
adopted by both social scientists and computer scientists [13],
[6]. There are many different randomized response mecha-
p q Relative Error (η) Privacy Level (ε)
0.3
0.3 0.1958 0.8873
0.6 0.1833 0.5390
0.9 0.1333 0.3895
0.6
0.3 0.0958 1.7918
0.6 0.0875 1.2528
0.9 0.0708 0.9808
0.9
0.3 0.0569 3.4340
0.6 0.0542 2.7726
0.9 0.0514 2.3979
Table I: The utility and the privacy guarantee of query results
with different coin flipping probabilities p and q. Here, utility
is measured by the query result’s relative error, and privacy is
measured by the level of achieved differential privacy. Before
randomization, there are 1000 original answers, 80% of which
are “yes”. Results are generated based on 100 independent
runs.
nisms in the literature. In this section, we present only the
mechanism described in [7] because it strikes a superior
balance between the utility and the privacy guarantee of
randomized responses, as compared to other mechanisms [13],
[11], [8], [9].
Mechanism Description Suppose each data owner has two
independently biased coins. Let the first coin flip heads with
probability p, and the second coin flip heads with probability
q. Without loss of generality, in this paper, heads is represented
as “yes” (i.e., 1), and tails is represented as “no” (i.e., 0).
Each data owner flips the first coin. If it comes up heads,
the data owner responds truthfully; otherwise, the data owner
flips the second coin and reports the result of this second coin
flip.
Suppose there are N data owners participating in the popu-
lation study. Let Yˆ represent the total aggregate of “yes“ ran-
domized answers. The estimated population with the sensitive
attribute YA can be computed as:
YA =
Yˆ − (1− p)×q×N
p
(2)
The intuition behind randomized response is that it provides
“plausible deniability”, i.e., any truthful answer can produce a
response either “yes” or “no”, and data owners retain strong
deniability for any answers they respond. If the first coin
always comes up heads, there is high utility yet no privacy.
Conversely, if the first coin is always tails, there is low utility
though strong privacy. As we show in in Table I, by carefully
controlling the bias of the two coin flips, one can strike a
balance between utility and privacy.
IV. EVALUATION
Our case study evaluates the campus scenario as seen in
Figure 3 whereby the points of interests include gyms, cafete-
rias, and libraries. A differentially private study is conducted
to measure real-time congestion levels whereby the collected
data is immediately released to the public.
Let us now consider the scenarios in which the individual
is offered a choice between participating in the study and
Figure 3: Map.
declining, however the study will always take place. The
campus under study has an estimated 30,000 undergraduates
and 12,000 graduates. We estimate that around 5,000 out of
the total 42,000 students decide to participate in the study and
around 2,000 decide to not participate. In order to calculate
the costs, as measured by time, in each of the individual
scenarios, we need to calculate the base cost and the worst
case cost that the individuals might incur. Lets call W , the
worst case cost and E, the base cost. The worst case cost
W would be the maximum amount of time that they would
have to spend at a particular location during the peak hours.
Let us assume that cost W in terms of number of minutes.
Let W = 60, i.e. the individual has to wait at the location for
a maximum of one hour at the peak hour. If the individuals
decide to not participate in the study, then the probability of
getting penalized by congestion at a particular location would
be high, because they would not be using the results about
congestion provided by the study. The study might have some
error estimating the congestion at a location, let us assume
that this probability p is 0.5. The base cost, if the participants
decide to not participate in the study would be the probability
considered above, times the worst case cost W .
E = p∗W = 0.5∗60 = 30 (3)
We can now calculate the cost for both the scenarios
individually.
A. Case 1: Individual does not participate
If the individual decides to not participate in the study, then
they will become penalized by the congestion at the location.
Also, since these individuals are not a part of the private study,
they have a higher probability of their location information
being disclosed. Let φ be the fraction of the participants who
might be de-anonymized. Let us consider this value to be 0.8
(i.e. 80 out of 100 participants are re-identified). Therefore, the
cost function when the individual decides to not participate in
the study (or we can also call this as, the cost function of
a non-private study) can be given by the following equation
described in [10]:
C = φ ∗W ∗N (4)
whereby
N is the number of participants who decide to not privately
participate. Let N = 2000 as mentioned above.
Therefore plugging in the values of φ , W and N in [10], the
cost would be:
C = 0.8∗60∗2000 = 96000 (5)
B. Case 2: Individual participates in the study
If the individual decides to participate in the study then the
base case cost would be reduced by some factor of ε , which
is the privacy level in a differentially private study. Therefore
the overall cost function as mentioned in [10] for a private
study can be given by the following equation:
C = (eε −1)∗E ∗N (6)
whereby
N is the number of participants who decide to participate in
the study. Let N = 5000 as mentioned above. E = 30 as given
in equation [10].
C. Choosing Epsilon
In our study, the individuals respond to the query with
randomized responses, using two coin flips/tosses. The value
of ε depends on the coin bias probabilities and the utility
which is the relative error. Table I shows different values of
epsilon for different coin bias probabilities (p for the first coin
and q for the second coin) and relative errors.
Plugging in the values of E, N and a few different values
of ε , we can obtain various values of cost. These values are
shown Table II.
As we can see from the table, the cost decreases as we go
on reducing the value of ε . We need to compare these values
of cost with the cost obtained in the first scenario where the
individual decides to not participate in the study. The cost of
our private study needs to be less than the cost of the non-
private study i.e. the cost when the individual decides to not
participate in the study. A lower cost indicates less amount of
time spent at the congested locations.
The value of cost will help us determine the value of epsilon
for our study. From the table above, we can say that for ε =
0.3895, we obtain a cost of 71436 which is less than the cost
96000. Thus, the value of ε = 0.3895 would be appropriate in
our case.
In order to analyze this further, we can plot the values
of epsilon vs cost and compare it with the cost as seen in
Epsilon (ε) Cost (C)
2.3979 1500008
1.2528 375020
0.8873 214285
0.539 107144
0.3895 71436
Table II: Cost as a function of Epsilon (ε).
Figure 4. The figure shows that adjusting the privacy parameter
ε influences the cost of participation. This is largely due to
the inherent trade-off with privacy-preserving mechanisms of
privacy versus accuracy. Greater privacy comes with a loss
of accuracy and vice-versa. The incentive for the individuals
to participate in the private study is the lower value of cost,
which is the amount of time they would spend at the congested
location. From the plot, we can say that all the values of ε
which fall below the non-participation cost would be ideal
values. Thus in this case, the plot shows that all values below
approximately 0.5 are ideal values of ε .
The smaller the value of ε , the better incentives there are for
an individual to participate. For example, the ε value of 0.0083
would have a cost of only 1250 which is favorable for the
individual. It’s important to observe that randomized response
is not able to achieve such small values of ε . However,
centralized aggregation mechanisms such as Laplace noise are
able to achieve such small values. Thus, considering cost as
defined here, we might want to say that the cost is better when
the Laplace mechanism is used as compared to the randomized
response.
D. Discussion
The cost estimations are done according to very specific
conditions in this study. Several different scenarios can be
considered where the congestion is going to vary based on
different times of the day or different seasons of the year. The
cost calculations depend on a number of factors such as N the
number of individuals participating and E which is the base
cost. These quantities might be very different for the different
scenarios mentioned above.
The differentially private study proposed in this report sug-
gests the use of randomized response for adding differentially
private noise to the output of the computation. However, as
observed in the comparison between the Laplace mechanism
and randomized response, the Laplace mechanism performs
better. Yet, it is important to note the parameters of the cost
function. There is a fundamental privacy notion difference
between Laplace noise and randomized response in that the
former is distributed and maintain local privacy while the
latter is centralized and requires strong trust assumptions of
the aggregator. It would be beneficial to consider factoring in
the trust assumptions into the cost computation.
V. CONCLUSION
We have examined a population study whereby individuals
are able to choose to privately participate or not. The utility
function for the individual is a cost function which factors
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Figure 4: Cost vs Epsilon.
the amount of time an individual may or may not spend at
a particular congested location. We have calculated costs for
two scenarios - one when the user decides to not participate
in the study and the other when the user participates in the
study. We demonstrate that by varying the privacy level ε
we can achieve a lower cost (i.e., less time spent at the
congested location) as compared to not participating in the
privacy study. Additionally, we raise the question of factoring
trust assumptions of services into the cost function as future
work.
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